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JULY 2018

POLICY BRIEF
Incentives and Local Job Creation
Timothy J. Bartik, W.E. Upjohn Institute
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n Typical incentives only “tip” 2–25
percent of decisions on where to locate
a business.
n Because incentive effects are
modest, many incentive policies may
have net benefits that are small or
even negative.
n Incentive studies frequently
overestimate incentive effects, because
incentives tend to select growing firms
and counties.
n For incentive evaluations to be
credible, they must at least consider
that fewer than one-quarter of
incentive offers succeed in creating
jobs.
n More precise and accurate
estimates of incentive effects depend
on better measurement of variations
in tax and incentive policies.

H
ow effective are economic development incentives? According to many economic
development agencies, tax incentives are critical to business location decisions. “But for”

the incentive, most or all incented firms would not have chosen to locate, expand, or
retain jobs at this location.
These high “but for” percentages are exaggerated. This research review shows that
the likely “but for” percentage for typical incentives is less than 25 percent. At least
75 percent of the time, the same local job creation would have occurred without the
incentive.
The “but for” percentage helps determine incentives’ benefits. If incentives tip 100
percent of location decisions, most incentives provide local residents with benefits greater
than costs. If incentives tip only a few business location decisions, incentive benefits are
more questionable.
Policymakers should know the following about incentive research:
1) Based on 30 studies, the “but for” percentage for typical incentives probably lies
between 2 percent and 25 percent.
2) Most current estimates of the “but for” percentage are positively biased. The firms
or areas receiving more incentives would tend to be growing more anyway, even
without the incentives.
3) Policymakers should doubt claims of incentive benefits that assume that all or
even most of the jobs associated with incented firms were due to the incentive.
Studies should include more conservative scenarios, in which less than 25 percent
of incentives tip location decisions.
4) Improvements in incentive evaluations require new empirical studies that better
measure business cost variation due to taxes and incentives. Such studies would
allow more precise estimates of incentive effects and benefits.

Research Evidence on Incentives

For additional details, see the full report:
“But For” Percentages for Economic
Development Incentives: What Percentage
Estimates Are Plausible Based on the Research
Literature?
This can be found at http://research.upjohn
.org/up_workingpapers/289/.

I reviewed 34 estimates of incentives’ effects. These estimates come from 30 studies.
I determined each study’s estimate of what percent of incented firms would not have
grown jobs in some state or local economy “but for” the incentive. This is the first such
comprehensive review.
Of the 34 estimates, I judged 23 to be positively biased—that is, they tend to overstate
the true “but for” percentage. I judged 4 estimates to be negatively biased. Seven had no
obvious bias.
Figure 1 shows the median estimated “but for” percentage. This is shown for all 34
estimates and for studies classified by likely bias.
For all estimates, the median “but for” percentage is 13 percent. Even for positively
biased studies, it is less than 25 percent. Negatively biased studies find no incentive effects.
For studies with no obvious bias, the median estimated “but for” percentage is 3 percent.
These studies focus on state and local incentives of a standard size. Typical incentives
are equivalent, as a percentage of a firm’s costs, to providing a permanent 3 percent wage
subsidy.
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Improving Economic Development Incentives

Typical incentives
probably sway less than 25
percent of incented firms.

Figure 1 Median
“But
FIGU
R E For”
1 : Percentage
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For a few prominent business location decisions, state incentives are far larger. For
example, Wisconsin recently offered Foxconn an incentive whose share of costs was
about 10 times as large as typical incentives.
The “but for” percentage should go up with the incentive’s percentage of firm costs.
Foxconn-sized incentives may have a larger “but for” percentage. A higher “but for”
percentage at a higher cost may not improve incentives’ benefits relative to costs. If costs
go up 10 times, and the “but for” percentage goes up by 10 times or less, the benefit-cost
ratio may stay the same or go down.
To sum up: typical incentives probably tip less than 25 percent of incented firms.
However, economic development agencies often claim credit for all incented firms.

How the “But For” Percentage Affects Benefit-Cost Ratios for Incentives
The “but for” percentage affects incentives’ benefits. If incentives create jobs, these jobs
create local benefits. Local earnings per capita increases because of higher employment
rates and wages. Fiscal benefits occur if higher tax revenue exceeds the public service
costs of growth. But these benefits depend on the incentives actually causing job growth.
The lower the “but for” percentage, the lower the job growth and the lower the local
benefits.
If incentives’ job growth effect is low enough, incentives can reduce local earnings per
capita. If incentives are financed by reducing public school spending, the lower school
quality may reduce future wages.
How would the “but for” percentages in these 34 estimates affect incentives’ benefitcost ratios? To address this issue, I use my incentive simulation model, which is described
in my 2018 report, Who Benefits from Economic Development Incentives? The model
assumes typical incentive costs and financing, and typical project job multiplier effects on
local economies.
Table 1 shows how various “but for” percentages affect the ratio of incentives’ net
benefits to costs. Net benefits are effects on local residents’ per capita incomes, including
the direct cost of paying for incentives. A positive ratio implies that income per capita
goes up, a negative ratio that it goes down. All benefits and costs are calculated as the
present value as of the time of the business location decision.
If incentives are always decisive, then an average-size incentive package has a very
high ratio of net benefits to costs. Job growth has high benefits, if it can be achieved.
However, for more realistic “but for” percentages, it is doubtful whether typical
incentives have positive net benefits for local residents. For example, if we use the 3.4
2
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Table 1 “But For” Percentages and Incentive Net Benefit-to-Cost Ratios

Policymakers should
demand that incentive
evaluations consider
more-realistic scenarios,
under which less than
one-quarter of incented
jobs are due to incentives.

“But for” percentage
Net benefits divided by incentive costs

0
−1.76

3.4
−1.19

12.7
0.39

23.5
2.23

100
15.21

NOTE: Net benefits are the present value of net local income per capita effects, after subtracting out direct
incentive costs. The gross benefit to cost ratio would add one to this ratio.

percent “but for” figure—the median for studies without obvious bias—net benefits are
negative.
If we use a 12.7 “but for” percentage—the median from all 30 studies—then incentives
have net positive benefits. But this net benefit is slight: 39 percent of incentives’ costs.
Relatively modest change in project features (e.g., job multiplier effects, how incentives
are financed) could easily turn net incentive benefits negative.

Why Many Incentive Studies Are Subject to Selection Bias
Most current incentive studies are likely positively biased. These studies are done
within a single state. They typically focus on how incentives affect either different
counties or different firms.
If the studies focus on different counties, they usually compare the job growth in
counties that receive a higher dollar amount of incentives versus other counties. If the
studies focus on different firms, the comparison is between firms that receive an incentive
and those that don’t.
For many such comparisons, the result is a likely positive “selection bias.” Incentives
tend to be selectively awarded to growing firms. Absent some special targeting, firms
or counties that grow more are likely to receive more incentives. Even with zero causal
effects of incentives on firm growth, there is likely to be a positive correlation between
firm or county growth and the magnitude of incentives awarded.
For a few studies, firms or counties with job growth problems are targeted for
incentives. These studies’ estimates of the “but for” percentage will be negatively biased.
The least biased studies compare the effects of different incentive policies. Most
such studies are of different states, with different incentive regimes. These studies try to
quantify how incentives are correlated with state job growth, holding constant other state
characteristics.
A single-state study can also be less prone to bias if it compares incentives whose
magnitude varies across different firms or counties, with this variation due to policy
choices that are not correlated with the firm or county’s preexisting growth trends.

What Policymakers Should Do with These Results
Based on the research literature, policymakers should be skeptical of claims that
every incented job was caused by the incentives. They should demand that incentives be
evaluated more realistically. Evaluations should consider scenarios under which less than
one-quarter of incented jobs were actually due to the incentives.
Policymakers should be aware that many estimates of incentive effects are biased.
Policymakers should ask, Is it plausible that the incented firms, or the more incented
counties, would have tended to have more local job growth even without the incentives?
Finally, policymakers should support more rigorous evaluation of incentive effects.
Incentives in different states, or different regions of the same state, should have their
magnitudes for different firms be more rigorously measured. This better data may allow
researchers to provide more accurate and precise estimates of incentives’ effects.
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